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INTERVENTION By Tiinu PARTIEs IN FEDERAL ADMINmsTRATIVE PROCEEDINGs
Qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dixerit,
haud aequum fecerit.*
I. Introduction
Intervention is the means employed by a third person seeking to become
a party to an adjudicative proceeding.' The typical suit at common law was
an A v. B proceeding. Entry by third persons was virtually unknown.2 Inter-
vention originated in the more flexible procedures utilized by courts of equity
and was used especially in in rem actions and in bills in the nature of inter-
pleader. The practice was later adopted by the law courts. The purpose of
intervention was to prevent a "failure of justice."' The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow intervention in all civil actions.' Whether to allow intervention
by a third party is left, in most cases, to the sound discretion of the trial judge,5
but there are situations in which a party may request intervention as of right."
The person to whom intervention is granted enjoys equal status with all other
parties to the proceeding.
Intervention before the federal administrative agencies is infinitely more
complex than intervention before a judicial tribunal, because administrative
rulings, as a practical matter, may affect many diverse groups and interests.7
* "He who decides anything, one party being unheard, though he should decide right,
does wrong. 6 Co. 52, 4 Bla. Com. 483." 2 Bouv. L.D. 2157 (Rawle's 3d rev. ed. 1914).
1 "Intervention deals with persons who want to become parties to the action and ask
permission to enter." Holtzoff, Entry of Additional Parties in a Civil Action, 31 F.R.D. 101
(1963).
2 For an excellent discussion of the history of intervention see Moore & Levi, Federal
Intervention I. The Right to Intervene and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565 (1936). See
also Holtzoff, supra note 1; Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAnv. L. Rlv. 874,
897 (1958).
3 Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 285 (1884).
4 FED. R. Cv. P. 24. See 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 591-604 (Wright ed. 1961); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 75 (1963).
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a con-
ditional right to intervene; or '(2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action
relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered
by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order,
requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order,
the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the
action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
7 For a general treatment of intervention in administrative law see DAVIs, AMINISTRATIVE
LAw §§ 8.11 & 22.08 (1959); Boros, Intervention in Civil Aeronautics Board Proceedings,
17 AD. LAW REv. 5 '(1964); Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Administrative
Action, 49 COLUm. L. Rzv. 759 (1949); Oberst, Parties to Administrative Proceedings, 40
MCm. L. REV. 378 (1942).
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Thus, the interest of allowing all persons who may be substantially, affected by
an agency determination to participate as parties must be weighed against the
equally important interest of conducting administrative proceedings with a reason-
able amount of speed and dispatch.'
Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides:
So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, any interested
person may appear before any agency or its responsible officers or employees
for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of any issue, request,
or controversy in any proceeding (interlocutory, summary, or otherwise)
or in connection with any agency function. 9
The rules of intervention before the various agencies are determined by
statute, agency rule, and administrative and judicial decisions.
II. Procedural Aspects of Intervention
A. Filing Petition to Intervene
The rules of the various federal administrative agencies specifically provide
the procedure to be followed by one desiring to intervene in a proceeding.' A
petition must first be filed with the agency in the manner prescribed, setting
forth facts sufficient to show the petitioner's interest." It must be specific. Mere
8 Participation as parties of persons only insubstantially or remotely interested or
affected is not necessary for protection of either private right or public interest.
Exclusion of such persons from participating as of right is necessary for efficient
conduct of the Commission's functions and to keep the hearings within manageable
bounds.
[On the other hand,] a rule which posits the basic right of hearing exclusively
upon mere convenience to the Commission or whether the petitioner's participation
"will be of assistance to it in determining the issues," leaving this to be determined
solely in its discretion, is not reasonable. It is a denial of any right to hearing. That
it may be inconvenient or time-consuming for such a body to hear persons sub-
stantially interested and affected, or that, in the Commission's exclusive discretion,
they may not be able to aid it, furnishes no basis for refusal to hear their side of the
case, whether on the -facts or on the law. Efficiency is not to be bought at such
a price to essential fairness. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545, 556-57
(D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
9 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1964).
10 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 301.6, 302.15 '(1966) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 16 C.F.R. §
3.9 (Supp. 1966) (Federal Trade Commission) ; 17 C.F.R. § 201.9 (1964) '(Securities Exchange
Commission); 18 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1961) (Federal Power Commission); 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.29,
102.65, 102.102, 102.109 (1966) (National Labor Relations Board); 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (1966)
(Federal Communications Commission); 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.40, 1.41, 1.47, 1.72, 1.73, 1.240(c),
1.245(c), 1.246(e) (1963 and 1966 Supp.) (Interstate Commerce Commission).
11 There are exceptions to the requirement that an interested third party must file a peti-
tion. For instance, the Securities Exchange Commission allows any state or federal agency to
become a party merely by filing a written notice of appearance. 17 C.F.R. § 201.9(a) (1964).
The Federal Power Commission allows a state commission, having jurisdiction to regulate rates
on electric energy or natural gas, to become a party by filing a notice of intervention. 18 C.F.R.
§ 1.8(a)(1) (1961). See also 17 C.F.R. § 201. 9 (a) (SEC) (1964). However, the agency
can still properly exclude these public commissions if it determines they have no legitimate in-
terest in the proceeding. See National Ass'n of Sees. Dealers, Inc., 15 S.E.C. 577, 580
(1944), where the SEC stated that the interest must be more than merely theoretical or aca-
demic. In this case the SEC allowed the Department of Justice to intervene because of its
interest in enforcing the antitrust laws. But see Austral Oil Co., 22 F.P.C. 858 (1959) and
Southern Nat'l Gas Co., 18 F.P.C. 179 (1957). In both cases, the Public Service Commission
of New York was denied participation since it could not make a showing of interest. Compare,
Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPO, 295 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 948 (1961).
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allegations that the petitioner will be affected, without any affirmative showing
of fact, will be held insufficient.12  i I
An otherwise proper petition may be dismissed if it is not filed during the
time prescribed by the agency's rules. 3 However, much discretion is exercised
as to what constitutes a timely petition,1 and agencies will not refuse to con-
sider it in extraordinary cases where good cause is shown for the delay.' 5 Failure
to see published notice of the hearing," failure to appreciate the nature of the
hearing and its possible adverse affect on the petitioner," and the negligent
failure of an employee to file a petition 5 have been held insufficient to constitute
good cause in individual cases. One does not waive his right to intervene by
failing to seek participation in a prior proceeding in which he had no substantial
interest.'" Individual agency rules may require a petitioner to give timely notice
to the other parties in the proceeding of his intention to intervene. Though he
12 The Civil Aeronautics Board is perhaps the most stringent. It requires a petitioner in
an economic proceeding to make specific reference to the following factors:
(1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the statute to be made a party to the
proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the property, financial or other interest of
the petitioner; (3) the effect of the order which may be entered in the proceeding
on petitioner's interest; (4) the availability of other means whereby the petitioner'sinter st may be prot cted; (5) the extent to whic  petitio er's interest will be repre-
sented by existing parties; (6) the extent to which petitioer's participation may
reasonably be expected to assist in the development of a sound record; and (7) theextent to which participation of the petitioner will broaden the issue or delay 
proceeding. 14 C.F.IR. § 302.15(b) (1966).
The Federal Communications Commission requires that the petitioner set forth his interestand how his participation will assist in determining the issues in question. The petition
must be accompanied by an affidavit of a person with knowledge of the facts set forth in the
petition. 47 C.F.R. § 1.223(b) (1966). If the petitioner is seeking intervention on the ground
that the granting of a license will cause interference with his existing station, his petition must
be accompanied by the affidavit of a qualified radio engineer showing the actual extent of the
interference. 47 C.F.R. § 1.223(a) (1966). 1
For a sampling of some of the agency decisions dismissing petitions for failure to state
specific facts, see, e.g., J. Capone & Sons, Inc., 83 M.C.C. 505 '(1960) ; Niagara Frontier Amuse-
ment Co., 4 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 27 (FCC 1954); Mid-South Broadcasting Co., 3 P. & F. Ad.
L.2d 441 (FCC 1953). See also United Fuel Gas Co., 15 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 527 (FPC 1964),where the FF0 allowed a competitor to intervene but noted that in future cases it would reserve
the matter of injury for hearing prior to the authorization of intervention.
13 The FCC requires petitions to be filed no later than thirty days after publication of the
hearing issues in the Federal Register. 47 C.F.R. § 1.223(d) (1966). The CAB requires peti-
tions to be filed no less than ten days prior to the hearing in air safety proceedings, 14 C.F. i§ 301.6 (1966); and, in economic proceedings, the petition must be filed prior to the pre-
hearing coaference or, if no coference, fifteen days prior to the hearing, 14 C.F.R. §
302.15(2) (in) '(1966). The ICC merely provides that petitions be fled prior to the proceed-
ing or at the time it is called for hearing. The NLRB per hat has the most liberal rules. It
allows a party to file a written motion to intervene prior to the hearing, or he can make an
oral motion at the hearing itself. 29 C.F.R. § 102.29 (1966).
14 The Commission may waive a time limit which i aimposed. The Middle West Corp.,
11 S.E.C. 355 (1942).15 M6ost agencies incorporate the good cause exception right into their rules. See 14 p.F.r.§§ 301.6, 302.15(2)(ifi) (1966) (CAB); 18 c .F.i § 1.8(d) (1961) (FPC); 47 C.F.R. §
1.223(d) (1966) (FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1.72(b) (1963) '(ICC).
16 United Gas Line Co., 29 F.P.C. 883 (1963); Woody Common Carrier Application, 73
M.C.C. 1 (1957). 1
17 Saint Louis-Southeast Serv. Case, 8 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 777 (CAB 1958); Service to
Phoenix Case, 7 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 738 '(CAB 1957). However, good cause was'shown where
the ICC had given, without notice, a new interpretation to a statute adversely affecting the
petitioner. National Bus Traffic Ass'n v. U.S., 212 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. ILL. 1962).
18 Chem-Haulers Inc., 16 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 876 (ICC 1964).
19 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. FCC, 211 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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may give timely notice to the agency, his application will be denied if he fails
to fulfill this requirement.
20
B. Status of the Intervenor
One who is allowed to intervene becomes a party to the proceedings. How-
ever, agencies do impose limits on the intervenor's right to participate.2
The original parties to the proceeding may possess the right to subpoena
witnesses, examine them, cross-examine opposing witness, enter objections
to questions, file -briefs, take exceptions to the intermediate report and the
proposed findings, and present oral argument. But an intervenor does
not necessarily enjoy the same rights.22
Furthermore, an intervenor may be interested in only one of several issues
being considered in the proceeding, and his participation may be properly limited
to that one issue.2 Failure to file a timely petition may also be grounds for
limiting the intervenor's rights of participation.24 The extent or terms of partici-
pation are thus considered to be largely within the discretion of the agency.2
The Commission's objective of keeping the hearings within manageable
bounds is to be achieved . . . not . . . by excluding persons who rightfully
should come in, but by controlling through reasonable regulation the extent
to which-they may take part. As to this the Commission has and rightfully
may exercise much authority in various specific ways.26
The Commission, however, cannot unduly restrict an intervenor's right to
participate, nullifying his presence in the proceeding as a party. As a practical
20 See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.40(c) & 1.241 (1963) (ICC). Intervention was held improper
under these circumstances in Lawrence Extension- Mineral Wool, 79 M.C.C. 73 (1959).
Compare Hart v. ICC, 226 F. Supp. 635, 645 (D. Minn. 1964), where the ICC allowed various
parties who had failed to file protests in a certificate proceeding to intervene, and the plaintiff
objected on the ground that he was confronted with unexpected protestants and therefore
deprived of due process under the fifth amendment. The court, noting that this was a serious
objection, dismissed the contention because the plaintiff failed to develop it beyond a mere
assertion. In rare cases a party might be legitimately surprised by the appearance of an inter-
venor, and thus be deprived of a fair hearing. It would be desirable, therefore, for the agencies
to provide that notice be given to all parties before a third person is allowed to intervene, and
this notice, as a practical matter, should include reference to the petitioner's interest and the
issues he intends to contest.
21 See 16 C.F.R. § 3.9(b) (1966 Supp.) (FTC).
22 Oberst, Parties to Administrative Proceedings, 40 Micr. L. REv. 378, 393 (1942). See
Maislin Bros. Transp.-Ltd., 75 M.C.C. 329 (1958).
23 See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. FPC, 243 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Seaboard & W. Airlines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963
(1950); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319
U.S. 239 (1943); Northern Nat'l Gas Co., 23 F.P.C. 708 (1960). See also American-La.
Pipe Line Co., 17 F.P.C. 671 (1957), where an intervenor's participation was terminated
when further participation would serve no real purpose.
24 Wilson & Co. v. U.S., 335 F.2d 788'(7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965).
Here the court found it proper for the Commission to limit the party to the state of the
proceeding at the time he intervened and to refuse him the right of cross-examining witnesses.
25 "If the Board is not unreasonable in its limitation of a proceeding, the courts ought not
to interfere, even if they have power to do so." Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, 247 F.2d 562, 566
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
26 National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S.
239 (1943).
27 See Hunt Oil Co. v. FPC, 334 F.2d 474 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S.
515 (1964).
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matter, the proceeding can probably best be controlled not by placing arbitrary
restrictions upon the rights of intervenors, but rather by giving the examiner
discretion to exclude irrelevant or unduly repetitious evidence. Where several
intervenors have substantially the same interest, limitations may be placed upon
their individual rights to cross-examine or present argument."8
Most agencies do have rules which allow persons to participate in proceed-
ings without the formal process of intervention. 9 Under these rules, any person
may appear at the hearing and present relevant evidence. With the examiner's
consent, he may also cross-examine witnesses, present argument, or otherwise
participate as the examiner deems appropriate. The usual requirement is that
the person have relevant evidence or that he be of assistance to the agency in
formulating its order. No showing of interest is necessary. These provisions,
however, should not be an excuse for denying an interested party's petition to
intervene. They are analogous to an amicus curiae in suits at law and, thus,
do not afford interested persons the status of "party. '30
As a general rule, parties enter the proceeding as they find it. Granting
intervention does not change or enlarge the issues."' In its discretion, however,
the agency may broaden the issues when conducive to arriving at a just order.
The Interstate Commerce Commission barred a third party from filing a com-
plaint for reparation because he failed to assert the issue in a prior proceeding,
in which he was allowed to intervene, contesting the reasonableness of certain
railroad rates. The plaintiff contended that to have asserted the issue of repara-
tion would have had the effect of enlarging the issues and thus would be pro-
hibited under § 1.72(e) of the agency's rules. The Commission, however, noted
that in prior cases it had allowed such a complaint to be filed in the initial
proceeding. It held: in the interest of preventing piecemeal litigation, the new
complaint should be barred. 2 Efficiency is promoted by broadening the issues
in a case where the remedy sought depends upon the factual and legal issues to
be determined in the initial proceeding. In many proceedings the interests of
justice require enlarging the issues to enable an agency to study all relevant
aspects of a given problem.
An intervenor is treated as a party. Hence the failure of an original party
to give him notice of a motion which would substantially affect his interest and
thereby deprive him of a chance to respond may be grounds for vacating the
subsequent order." The intervenor may also call a nonparty witness, who has
been denied intervention, to give relevant testimony even though the effect is
to circumvent the previous order of the agency3 4 Also, an intervenor may be
28 See 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(g) (1961) (FPC).
29 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.14(b), 302.214 '(1966) (CAB); 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.9(c) & (d)
(1964) (SEC); 47 C.F.R. § 1.225 (1966) (FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1.73 (1963) (ICC). See also
National Airlines, Inc., 9 C.A.B., 264 (1948); United Gas Pipe Line Co., 29 F.P.C. 883
'(1963); Electric Bond & Share Co., 11 S.E.C. 359 (1942); United Light & Power Co., 8
S.E.C. 561 (1941).
30 See FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239, 246 (1943); Seaboard & W. Airlines v. CAB,
181 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950).
31 Trans-Cold Express, Inc., 15 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 823 (ICC 1964); American Tel.-& Tel.
Co., 7 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 702, 704 (FCC 1957).
32 Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 279 I.C.C. 178 (1950).
33 Hurley Oil & Gas Co., 29 F.P.C. 417 (1963).
34 Tisdale Transfer & Storage Co., 73 M.C.C. 541 '(1957).
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required to prove his actual interest in the proceeding by producing various
records requested by the other party. 5 He cannot rely upon the allegations of
interest stated in his petition to prevent an applicant from developing a proper
record to show that the intervenor would not in fact be adversely affected by
the issuance of the requested certificate. Though an intervenor is not required
to come into the proceeding, once he enters, he cannot leave at will. He remains
a party until he is dismissed by the agency, and the agency may properly refuse
to allow him to remove himself or to amend or withdraw an averment. 6
An intervenor does not always have standing to seek review of an agency's
final order." An administrative agency is not bound by the constitutional
requirement of case or controversy as are federal courts. Complex rules have
been developed to determine who possesses sufficient standing to assert a claim
in a federal court." Nothing in the Constitution, however, restricts appearance
before an administrative body. Thus, if not prohibited by statute, an agency
may allow anyone to appear as a party regardless of whether he would have
standing in a judicial proceeding. Consequently, when an intervenor seeks
review of an administrative order, the mere fact that he had standing before
the agency does not mean he has standing before the court.3 The person seek-
ing review is commencing a new proceeding, and he must establish anew that
he is adversely affected.
C. Appeal from Denial of Intervention
One may appeal an order denying intervention in an administrative pro-
ceeding. The important question being: is the order final and thus immediately
appealable? There are sound practical reasons for allowing an immediate appeal
35 Texas E. Transmission Corp., 15 F.P.C. 1565 (1956).
36 See Southwestern Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Area Rate
Proceeding, 29 F.P.C. 737 (1963); Texas E. Transmission Corp., 16 F.P.C. 705 (1956). In
the latter case the FPC noted that:
A person should not be permitted to intervene in a proceeding and by his partici-
pation bring about a long and protracted hearing and then, by the simple expedient
of amendment to or withdrawal of an averment in the petition to intervene, remove
himself from a given phase of a case without at least having undertaken voluntarily
to present to us all changes in facts with respect to the interest theretofore averred to
be such as would be adversely affected. Justification for withdrawal or amendment
should equal the justification for intervention ...
Statements made by counsel for a party to a proceeding before us in offering to
withdraw requests are not controlling. Our duty "to explore all pertinent aspects of
intervener's relationship to the matter under consideration" to the end that the record
will contain facts with respect to the true interest and possible aggrievement of inter-
vener's is paramount. Texas E. Transmission, supra at 706, 709.
37 See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW, § 22.08 (1959).
38 See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 '(1943); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Frothingham
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
39 In the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 268 (1924), J. Brandeis stated that allow-
ing the petitioner to intervene before the agency showed that he possessed interest and could
seek review. However, only a few years later, J. Brandeis held that allowing the petitioner to
intervene gave him no right to review. He noted that in this case the petitioner suffered only
indirect harm from the operations of a competitor and that the Commission's order did not
really affect him. Pittsburgh & W. Va. R.R. v. U.S., 281 U.S. 479, 486 (1930).
For cases denying review to intervenors for failure to show sufficient interest, see South-
western Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co.
v. FPC, 219 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1955); Interstate Blec. Inc. v. FPC, 164 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.
1947).
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from an order denying intervention. The arguments against piecemeal review
are far outweighed by the time wasted if a party must wait until the administra-
tive proceeding is terminated before obtaining a judicial determination of the
correctness of an order. If at that time the court finds the petition improperly
denied, the previous proceedings are vacated and a new hearing is required.
Such a procedure would unduly complicate and delay the administrative process.
To remedy this situation, most courts have held denial of the right to intervene
an immediately reviewable, final order.4" In Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC,4'
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated
that a would-be intervenor can seek review of a denial of intervention at the
time his petition to intervene is dismissed. The court also held that the time
limit for his right to appeal is dated from the denial and not from the final order
of the agency. This decision is sound.' As a practical matter, a person should
not be allowed to thwart the administrative process by delaying his appeal until
the proceeding is finally terminated. Of course, the mere fact that the proceeding
terminates before his right to appeal expires would not defeat his right to review.42
The federal courts in civil proceedings have distinguished between the
denial of intervention as of right and the denial of discretionary intervention. '
They hold the former immediately appealable, but dismiss the latter as inter-
locutory. The courts have followed this distinction in deciding appeals from
administrative bodies.44 The distinction is largely illusory and serves no practical
purpose. In order to decide whether intervention is of right or merely discre-
tionary, the court must look at the merits. To, then dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion is incongruous. The right-discretion distinction should be abolished.
Federal courts are reluctant to grant a temporary stay of agency proceedings
pending review of an order denying intervention." While courts should sparingly
use the injunctive remedy to regulate administrative proceedings," it can be
persuasively argued that when the petitioner's evidence on the merits shows
that he is likely to be granted intervention, public interest is best served by
enjoining the agency from proceeding with a hearing which may ultimately be
nullified. The petitioner probably will be unable to show the requisite irreparable
injury to himself to justify the injunction, but the expense and time consumed
in having to reconduct a hearing are public policy factors in favor of halting
proceedings to await a determination by the court.
40 American Communications Ass'n v. U.S., 298 F.2d 648 '(2d Cir. 1962); Interstate
Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 284
F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
41 284 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
42 Id. at 20B.
43 See 2 BARRON & HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 604 (Wright ed. 1961);
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 75 (1963). See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & 0.
R.R., 331 U.S. 519 (1947).
44 See American Communications Ass'n v. U.S., 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); Interstate
Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v.
FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Alston Coal Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1943).
45 Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Sykes v.
Jenny Wren Co., 78 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Sunshine Broadcasting Co. v. Fly, 33 F. Supp.
560 (D.D.C. 1940).
46 See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
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III. Who May Intervene
The question whether a third person is entitled to intervene in an adjudica-
tory proceeding must be determined upon the facts of each case. Due process
guarantees an absolute right to participate as a party, to one who will be directly
bound by a final judgment4 The problem intervention presents is who besides
those who are directly involved should be allowed to participate. Most statutes
simply allow "any interested person" or "any person who will be adversely
affected by the proceeding" to intervene. 8 Thus, ultimately the agencies and
the courts determine what third parties display sufficient interest to entitle them
to be made parties.
It is frequently stated that one who has a right to judicial review of an
agency's final order should be permitted to intervene.49 This view is correct.
One who is entitled to review should be entitled to participate in the hearing
from the outset. Where judicial review can only be sought by a party to the
proceeding, it is clear that review could be defeated if an agency adopts a
restrictive policy toward intervention.5"
Where the same statute confers the right of review and the right to intervene
to any interested person, these two provisions are analogous. However, to say
that one who may appeal may intervene begs the question. In either case it
must be determined whether the third party's interest is sufficiently substantial
to confer this right upon him.
The claim of the original parties that they are prejudiced by the appear-
ance of third parties is no ground for denying intervention to interested parties.5
Also an agency does not abuse its discretion by denying intervention in an
adjudicative proceeding when the petitioner has been allowed to argue the very
same points in a prior rule-making hearing.52
Perhaps the most common type of intervention occurs when the petitioner
has an economic interest in the proceeding. It was recognized early by the
Interstate Commerce Commission that competitors may intervene in its pro-
ceedings.53 The federal courts have consistently held that a competitor has
standing to challenge the FCC's grant of a license to a rival station.5 Of course,
47 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Ohio Bell Tel. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301
U.S. 292 (1937); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464 (1918); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
48 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 *(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964)
(good cause); Atomic Energy Act, 76 Stat. 409 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1964) (any
person whose interest may be affected); Communications Act, 74 Stat. 889 (1960), 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(e) (1964) (party in interest); Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 796 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §
1489 (1964) '(all persons interested in or affected by the matter).
49 American Communications Ass'n v. US, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); National Coal
Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Seaboard & W. Airlines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515
(D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950).
50 National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
51 Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Oscar Porter, 72 M.C.C. 537 (1957).
52 Coastal Bend TV Co. v. FCC, 234 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
53 See Alton R.R. v. U.S., 315 U.S. 15 (1942) (trucker in competition with R.R.);
Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. U.S., 285 U.S. 382 (1932) (ferry in competition with R.R.);
Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924) (other railroads as competitors).
54 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Interstate Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 285 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 265 F.2d 353
(D.C. Cir. 1959); Elm City Broadcasting Corp. v. U.S., 235 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Granik v. FCC, 234 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Greenville Television Co. v. FCC, 221 F.2d
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where the economic effect of the proceeding on the competitor is not sufficiently
shown or is too remote, intervention will not be allowed."
In National Coal Ass'n v. FPC,5 a leading case on the status of competi-
tors, a gas company applied to the Federal Power Commission for a certificate
of public convenience and necessity, under the Natural Gas Act, to construct
a pipeline to the Atomic Energy Plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The FPC
granted a petition to intervene by the National Coal Association, a competitor
of the applicant, and the United Mine Workers, representing the employees of
the association. The court held that the petitioners were interested parties likely
to be aggrieved by the displacement of coal by natural gas. 7 The court also
recognized that a possible loss of employment could make the employees
"aggrieved," entitling them to judicial review. It stated:
We see no reason and none is suggested to us, for considering the
interest of employees in retention of their employment in the competing
companies as any less substantial than the interest of competitors in retain-
ing their markets or the prospect of loss of employment any less direct and
immediate than the loss of markets with which the competing companies
are threatened. The employees of competing companies, as much as the
owners thereof, have a sufficiently direct relationship to the subject matter
of the Commission's order to be "aggrieved."58s
Perhaps the most liberal decision holding a competitor to be an interested
party is Philco Corp. v. FCC." The Federal Communications Commission
granted a television license to NBC for the Philadelphia area. Philco filed a
protest. Philco was not in the broadcasting business; it manufactures electronics
equipment and in no way competed with NBC. NBC, however, is owned by
RCA, which does manufacture electronics equipment and is in competition
with Philco. Philco alleged that RCA was granted advertising preferences on
NBC thereby violating trade practices under the antitrust laws. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Philco,
as a competitor of RCA, had standing to protest the license granted to NBC."0
870 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Salinas Broadcasting Corp., 3 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 369 (FCC 1953);
Versluls Radio & TV, Inc., 3 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 365 (FCC 1953). For decisions concerning
other agencies to the same effect, see City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir.
1956); Northeastern Gas Transp. Co. v. FPC, 195 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1952); Cia Mexicana
De Gas v. FPC, 167 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1948); Balair Ag., No. 16816, CAB, Feb. 9, 1966.
55 See, e.g., Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPO, 282 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 913 (1960); Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 280 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943); Houston Texas
Gas & Oil Corp., 15 F.P.C. 1570 (1956); Yellow Cab 'Co., 3 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 367 (FCC
1953); Kansas State College of Agriculture & Applied Science, 2 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 738 (FCC
1952); Station KFST, 1 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 450 (FCC 1951).
56 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also American Communications Ass'n v. U.S., 298
F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 265 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir.
1959).
57 Id. at 465.
58 Id. at 466.
59 257 F.2d 656 '(D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959).
60 The court, however, stated that:
Our decision gives standing to a competitor in the position of Philco only to
protest a renewal after it is known that licensed facilities are being used by the com-
peting manufacturer directly to obtain a preferential economic advantage over the
protestant. Furthermore, even in those circumstances the standing here is to protest
only with respect to renewal of a license of a station wholly owned or controlled by
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Competitors with sufficient interest must be allowed to intervene by the
Civil Aeronautics Board in final hearings to determine mail rate subsidies.61
However, intervention is seldom allowed in temporary rate proceedings where
time is of the essence and the interest of the applicant and the public demand
a less cumbersome proceeding.62 But even here the Board may permit third
parties to present evidence.6"
Employees and their unions may be economically affected by agency orders.
When this occurs, they should be allowed to intervene. 4 Intervention is seldom
an issue in unfair labor practice proceedings before the National Labor Relations
Board. The Board automatically includes as parties the person filing the charge,
any person named as respondent, as employer, or as party to a contract in the
proceeding; and also any labor organization alleged to be dominated, assisted,
or supported in violation of § 8(a)(I) or § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act.6" These liberal provisions include nearly anyone who would
be affected by the proceeding. Thus, intervention is seldom resorted to.6
Stockholders may have an economic interest in proceedings before the
Securities Exchange Commission. However, the SEC seldom permits inter-
vention as a party, but leave to appear as a limited participant is most freely
given.6 7
The Supreme Court has ruled that economic injury is not the only basis
upon which one may assert his rights as a party in interest. In FCC v. NBC
the competitor, which would not often be the case. We leave other situations for
other cases. Id. at 659.
61 See Seaboard & W. Airlines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 963 (1950); Boros, Intervention in Civil Aeronautics Board Proceedings, 17 AD.
LAW REV., 5, 27 (1964).
62 Seaboard & W. Airlines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 963 (1950); Northwest Airlines, Inc., 12 C.A.B. 185 (1949); American Airlines, 10
C.A.B. 185 (1949); National Airlines, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 264 (1948).
63 See National Airlines, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 264 (1948), where the Commission allowed the
Airline Pilots Ass'n and the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists to present evidence of a labor dispute at
temporary rate proceedings.
64 See, e.g., National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 *(D.C. Cir. 1951); Power Reactor
Dev. Co., 6 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 549 (AEC 1956); National Airlines Inc., 9 C.A.B. 264 (1948).
See also American Fed'n of Musicians v. FCC, 356 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where the court
avoided the question whether the American Federation of Musicians had standing to protest
renewal of a license when the licensee had originally promised to devote a certain amount of
time to live music and failed to do so.
65 29 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1966). This rule puts to rest some rather confusing Supreme Court
decisions. In NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines Inc., 303 U.S. 250 (1938), the Court
held that a dominated union need not be made a party to a proceeding under § 8(a) (2) of the
National Labor Relations Act. Accord, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146
(1941); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 '(1940); NLRB v. Indiana & Mich.
Elec. Co., 124 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1941); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 9 (7th Cir.
1940). However, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 232 (1938), the
Supreme Court, in distinguishing the Pennsylvania Greyhound, said that the Board should have
accorded the union notice and a hearing before setting aside its contract with the employer.
66 Letter from Thomas P. Healy, Ass't Director of Information, NLRB, to the NOTRE
DAME LAWYER, April 15, 1966, on file with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER. See Semi-Steel Casting
Co. v. NLRB, 160 F.2d 388 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758 (1947) (refusal to allow
employees to intervene in § 8(a) (1) and § 8(a) (5) proceeding within discretion of agency);
NLRB v. Star Publishing Co., 97 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1938).
67 See 17 C.F.R:. §§ 201.9(c), (d) (1964). Letter from David Ferber, Solicitor, SEC, to
the NOTRE DAME LAWYER, April 26, 1966, on file with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER. See, e.g.,
Electric Bond & Share Co., 3 P. & F. Ad. L. 41g.51-3 (1947); Electric Bond & Share Co., 11
S.E.C. 359 (1942); United Light & Power Co., 8 S.E.C. 561 (1941), for cases allowing stock-
holders limited participation.
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(KOA) "s the Supreme Court held that the holder of an existing broadcasting
license may intervene to protest the granting of a license which will cause
channel interference with his operations. The FCC had allowed an increase
in power and time to a Boston station' Though there was no formal modifica-
tion of a Denver station's license, since it was a clear channel station at night,
the increase did cause a certain amount of electrical interference with the sta-
tion's operations some seven hundred miles east of Denver. This was sufficient,
the Court said, to make the Denver station a party in interest and to entitle it
to become a formal party to the proceeding.6" The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has held: if the FCC assigns additional
frequencies, already assigned to existing licensees, to go into effect at the expira-
tion of the former licenses, if proper rule-making procedures are followed, there
is no modification requiring an adjudicatory, evidentiary heaiing"
Private parties are not the only ones who may be affected by agency deci-
sions. What distinguishes administrative from judicial proceedings is that the
former will affect large segments of the public. Thus a competitor may have
a vital interest in whether the FCC will grant an additional broadcasting license,
or whether the CAB will route additional airlines to a particular city, but his
interest is no greater than the interest of the public who is to be served by these
facilities. In fact, his interest may be opposed to that of the public. For this
reason, intervention limited to interested, private parties and dependent upon
them to assert the public interest, is unrealistic."1 It may be said that the com-
missioners themselves represent and protect the public interest, but this is a
mere generalization. The CAB cannot possibly know whether the public interest
is best served by routing planes traveling from Florida to California through
Dallas or Houston, unless opposing groups are able to present their case before
the Board. For this reason, intervention should be freely given to public
agencies, municipalities, and civic groups. Many agencies allow interested state
and federal agencies, municipalities, or other public groups to appear before
them as parties, merely by filing a notice of appearance without requiring a
Jformal petition to intervene. Very often these public bodies can show some
68 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
69 The court found the fact that petitioner had been allowed to present oral argument
amicus curiae before the Commission immaterial. Id. at 246. Under the FCC's rules, one
desiring to intervene must state with particularity the extent of the interference he will suffer,
and this must be attested to by a qualified engineer. 47 O.F.R. § 1.223(a) (1966).
70 Goodwill Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 325 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The court stated
further that:
The practical effect, and the legal result which we think follows, is that there
actually was no modification prior to the expiration of the licenses. These remained
with their original integrity for the three year terms of their existence. Id. at 641.
See also DAvis, ADmINISTRATrIV LAW § 8.11 (1965 Supp.).
71 See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 320 U.S. 707 (1943),
in which J. Frank outlined the private attorney, generals concept. He stated that interested
parties appeared before the commissions as private attorney generals. See also FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); DAvis, ADmINISTRATIvE LAW § 22.05
(1959). Such an analysis is a simplification of reality. An intervenor will assert his own
interest. This evidence is in the public interest insofar as it develops a more complete
record, but it cannot be equated with the public interest. The public interest is found only
by weighing the testimony of all interested groups.
72 See note 11 supra.
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direct economic effect entitling them to intervene,7" but this should not always
be required. An agency's decision may also have a direct effect upon policies
entrusted to another public body. For instance, the Department of Justice may
have a vital interest in many agency decisions because of its duty to enforce the
antitrust laws. This interest, as a practical matter, should give it standing to
appear before that agency.'4
Private individuals and groups, who have no other interest than as mem-
bers of the general public, have generally been denied intervention by the
agencies." This denial rests on sound practical reasons. To allow members of
the general public to become formal parties would unduly burden the adminis-
trative process. When such persons have relevant evidence to present to agencies,
they are generally accorded limited participation."6
A recent decision rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit gives a very realistic approach to the issue of inter-
vention by private parties who can show no actual economic effect. In Office
of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,7 various members of
the listening public protested the renewal of station WLBT's license in Jackson,
Mississippi, alleging the station discriminated on the grounds of race and religion.
The FCC denied the petition to intervene and renewed the license on a one-year
probationary period. The would-be intervenors appealed on the ground that
they represented nearly one-half of WLBT's potential listening audience and
were denied the right to present their side of the controversy. The court reversed
the denial, and, after taking cognizance of the widespread fear that a host of
parties would disrupt agency proceedings, stated:
Since the concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed
to insure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can par-
ticipate in a proceeding, we can see no reason to exclude those with such
an obvious and acute concern as the listening audience. This much seems
essential to insure that the holders of broadcasting licenses be responsive
to the needs of the audience, without which the broadcaster could not
exist....
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the
listener interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and participation
of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys
73 For cases allowing intervention, see, e.g., City of Houston v. CAB, 317 F.2d 158 '(D.C.
Cir. 1963); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 295 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
948 (1961); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Detroit-Toronto,
Erie-Toronto Route Case, No. 16928, CAB, April 11, 1966; Los Angeles/Chicago-Toronto
Serv. Case, No. 16901, CAB, March 16, 1966; Reopened So. Transcontinental Serv. Case,
No. 7984, CAB, 3, 1964. See also Boros, supra note 61, at 21.
74 See National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 15 S.E.C. 577 (1944). But see New York-
Fla. Renewal Case, 14 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 474 '(CAB 1963).
75 See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. FPC, 243 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(private corp. which had no economic interest refused intervention); The Good Music
Station, Inc. 6 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 930 (FCC 1957) '(local citizens group refused intervention);
WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 4 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 753 (FCC 1954) (citizens group made
no showing of economic interest and was refused intervention); Capital Broadcasting Co.,
2 P. & F. Ad. L.2d 704 (FCC 1952) (Transit Riders Ass'n, composed of members of public
who travel on vehicles of transit company, held to have no interest). But see Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) (conservation committee, allowed
to intervene in FPC hearing).
76 See statutes and cases cited supra note 29.
77 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to work with so
long as they are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does
to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption which stands up under
the realities of actual experience, neither we nor the Commission can con-
tinue to rely. on it. The gradual expansion and evolution of concepts of
standing in administrative law attests that experience rather than logic
or fixed rules has been accepted as the guide.78
To keep hearings within manageable bounds, the court noted that inter-
vention need not be granted to all of the petitioners so long as one or more
responsible representatives were allowed to assert their interest.79
IV. Conclusion
Who may appear before an administrative agency must be determined on
a case-by-case basis. The Administrative Procedure Act states that any interested
person may appear before an agency, and most statutory provisions are similarly
broad. Thus, it falls upon the agencies and the courts to determine who is an
interested person entitled to intervene. Very often the agencies emphasize the
impact that the participation of a third party will have on the agency procedure
itself rather than the actual interest of the third party8 0 Such a narrow approach
is not really consistent with congressional directives. There is no metaphysical
formula that can be devised to determine who is a party in interest. The con-
stitutional requirement of case and controversy does not apply to administrative
agencies. Thus who can intervene need not be limited to the narrow rules
governing who can constitutionally secure judicial review. The policy in favor
of broad participation must be balanced against the fact that the agencies have
a job to do which must be accomplished with a reasonable amount of speed
and dispatch. For this reason courts should be reluctant to impose restrictions
upon the functioning of the administrative process.8 " Intervention thus depends
upon the practical considerations in each case. If a petitioner has a legitimate
interest in the proceeding which will not be adequately represented by existing
parties, he should be allowed to intervene. Though the participation of third
parties may cause proceedings to be more complex and lengthy, the various
agencies do have a basic duty to act in the "public interest," and the "public
interest" can be determined only by securing relevant evidence from all interested
groups. Administrative agencies were developed in a large part because the
traditional two-party adversary approach of the courts was incapable of adjudi-
cating some of the more complex questions affecting the general public. The
usefulness of administrative adjudication lies precisely in the fact that it is not
limited by the more formalized procedures of the courts. If it restricts and
formalizes its procedures, the usefulness of the administrative process as a com-
plement to the judicial process will cease.
Michael P. Seng
78 Id. at 1002-03.
79 Id. at 1006.
80 See Boros, supra note 61, at 7.
81 See FCC v. NBC '(KOA), 319 U.S. 239, 248 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
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